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Thank you, Jerry.

It is always a pleasure to speak to NAM.

At about this time last year, I spoke to a business group
about my views on upcoming international trade issues. At that
point, I was barraged by questions about the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations.
An agreement was expected to be concluded in Brussels in
December of 1990. Expectations were running high.
All major business groups were meeting with Congress and the
Administration to make their views known on various issues in the
negotiations. Hotel rooms were being frantically reserved in
Brussels to make sure that U.S. businesses had their views
represented during the critical negotiations.
But the Brussels negotiations ended without an agreement.
Since that time, the prognosis for the Uruguay Round has
grown steadily worse.
Only a few weeks ago, a major U.S. business leader put the
chances of a successful Round at one in ten or less.
Although another session is scheduled in Brussels this
December, we have heard little from the business community on the
Uruguay Round. I am confident that few hotel rooms have been
booked in Brussels.
STAKES IN THE URUGUAY ROUND

I certainly don't blame the U.S. business community for the
apparent collapse of the Round. That blame lies squarely on the
backs of the EC and Japan for their continued intransigence on
agriculture.
But we must keep in mind that the collapse of the Round is
more than a loss for Brussels' hotel keepers.

The Administration should make it clear, however, that such
an agreement would only be acceptable if it included truly
substantial benefits for the U.S. in other areas.
In particular, significant gains would be required in four
areas:
First, any agreement must include an acceptance of the U.S.
proposal to abolish tariffs worldwide in many key industrial
sectors, including wood and paper products, semiconductors, and.
aluminum.
Second, the agreement must not in any way undermine the
U.S.' unfair trade laws, such as Section 301 and countervailing
duty law. These laws are not trade barriers. In fact, they are
aimed at combatting trade barriers. They should not be
restricted.
Third, a final Uruguay Round agreement should include
substantial new disciplines on industrial subsidies. According
to estimates periodically done by the OECD, the U.S. consistently
extends fewer industrial subsidies than any other major nation.
Thus, limits on subsidies would clearly benefit the U.S. Yet,
industrial subsidies have never been a central focus of the
The U.S. should insist that meaningful subsidy
Round.
disciplines be included in a final agreement.
Finally, an agreement must provide for improved protection
of U.S. intellectual property. Piracy of U.S. intellectual
property costs the U.S. billions of dollars in lost exports each
year. The final GATT Round package must end this piracy.
Progress in other areas, such as trade in services, would
also be very important to any final package.
UNILATERAL ACTIONS
Many of the trade barriers being discussed in the Uruguay
Round are simply too important to ignore.
If they cannot be addressed in the Round, the U.S. must seek
to address them through bilateral negotiation and, if necessary,
unilateral action.
Such unilateral action will also demonstrate to our trading
partners that the collapse of the Round will not shift world
attention away from their trade barriers.
Reasonable people can disagree about which foreign barriers
deserve the most attention. But I believe that four unilateral
trade initiatives should be taken by the U.S.

First, the U.S. should take action under U.S. trade laws to
address the EC's subsidies to Airbus.
Through the use of subsidies, Airbus has been built into a
world class aircraft manufacturer. With the benefit of continued
subsidies, Airbus now threatens American aircraft manufacturers,
such as Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.
Action on this issue is long overdue.
extended to Airbus are egregious.

The subsidies

The U.S. has and should continue to seek to address this
issue in the GATT. But, in parallel, the U.S. should employ the
fu1 range of U.S. trade laws, including Section 301,
countervailing duty law, and anti-dumping law, against Airbus.
We cannot afford to wait any longer on this issue.
Second, the U.S. should begin trade actions directed at
penetrating Japan's closed corporate structure -- the Keiretsu.
Japan continues to import much less per capita than any
other developed country. Now, Japan's trade surplus with the
world is once again on the rise.
Over the last three years, the U.S. trade deficit with most
of its trading partners shrunk dramatically. But the deficit
with Japan remains stuck at over $40 billion per year.
Some progress has been made with Japan. Bilateral
agreements have been concluded to remove Japanese trade barriers
on products ranging from forest products to supercomputers. U.S.
exports to Japan have increased.
But much.more remains to be done. Most observers view the
collusive Japanese corporate structure -- the Keiretsu -- as the
heart of the problem. According to a recent study from the
Brookings Institute, the Keiretsu structure encourages Japanese
businesses to deal with other related Japanese businesses for
parts and supplies. As a consequence, Keiretsu discourage
imports.
After years of working around the edges and trying to
address the Keiretsu problem through the Structural Impediments
Initiative, it is time to launch a major Section 301zz
investigation directed at the trade distorting aspects of the
Keiretsu structure.
In parallel, the U.S. should join the rest of the world in
pursuing a sweeping trade action directed at Japanese trade
barriers under Article 23 of the GATT.
Article 23 outlines actions that can be taken against a GATT
Member that pursues measures that block imports and thus nullify

or impair other trade concessions.
Article 23 has never before been used for such a broad
action as I am suggesting. But I believe the time is right. The
entire world has an interest in opening the Japanese market to
two-way trade. It is time for the entire world to take action.
By acting under Article 23 -- as I suggested in 1987 -- I
believe we have a good chance to bring multilateral pressure on
Japan to open its market. Such an approach also has the
advantage of working through the GATT and thus increasing its
credibility.
On a third front, the U.S. should continue to aggressively
use the Special 301 provisions of the 1988 Trade Act to promote
better intellectual property protection around the world.
Special 301 has already proven effective in combating piracy of
intellectual property in many developing countries.
But the U.S. should intensify use of Special 301. Such
action will demonstrate to reluctant development countries that
the U.S. will attack piracy of intellectual property bilaterally
if it is unable to do so through the GATT.
Finally, the U.S. must be prepared to step up its own farm
export subsidies.
One of the major objectives of the U.S. in the Uruguay Round
has been to limit EC export subsidies. If we fail to reach such
an agreement, we have no choice but to boost our own export
subsidies to protect American farmers.
Last year's budget agreement provides for an automatic
increase in agricultural export subsidies if the Round fails to
yield an agricultural trade agreement by July, 1992. The
Administration should aggressively implement this provision.
LEADERSHIP FROM THE TOP
In addition to the deadlock over agriculture, the Round is
also suffering from a lack of leadership.
Only the U.S. has the vision and the economic clout to push
the rest of the world to conclude the Round.
But on the foreign policy front, this Administration seems
focused on other things, such as setting up a Middle East peace
conference and building a new relationship with the Soviet Union.
These objectives are laudable. But the Adminsitration has
yet to recognize that the central threat to our national security
is now economic, not military. We must now focus on trade
negotiations with the same intensity previously reserved for arms

control negotiations.
Ambassador Hills has done an excellent job of leading U.S.
efforts in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
However, these negotiations call for world leaders to make
By herself, she is unlikely to be able to force
tough choices.
the Uruguay Round to the top of world leaders' agendas.
If they are to succeed, the negotiations will require a
personal commitment from President Bush and Secretary Baker as
well as the continued efforts of Ambassador Hills.
The completion of the Uruguay Round must be made a top
priority of the Administration. President Bush and Secretary
Baker must personally press the Uruguay Round with world leaders
above other concerns.
The Round must be made the centerpiece of U.S. international
economic policy.
If this commitment is not forthcoming, the hard choices will
never be made and the Round will simply fade away.

CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the proposal I have outlined is bold. Some have
already advised me that they believe the Bush Administration will
not be willing to take such bold action.
If the skeptics turn out to be correct, it will be a loss
for America and the world.
As I said, the Bush Administration must recognize that the
world has changed. Economic strength is now at least as
important as military strength.
If the U.S. is to remain a great nation it must pay much
more attention to its economic strength and trading status.
Trade cannot continue to take a back seat to military and
diplomatic concerns.
There no longer are foreign policy priorities higher than
expanding U.S. trade opportunities. That means that the Uruguay
Round is the most important initiative now on our agenda.
The Bush Administration must work to conclude the Uruguay
Round with the same vigor that it confronted Iraq.
The U.S. must use its economic strength and its diplomatic

influence to bring the Round to a successful conclusion within
the next few months.
If not, the opportunity will soon slip away.

